Develop, document, and disseminate to organization-defined personnel or roles:
one or more,Organization-level,Mission/business process-level,System-level system and information integrity policy that:
Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and
Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and the associated system and information integrity controls;
Designate an organization-defined official to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the system and information integrity policy and procedures; and
Review and update the current system and information integrity:
Policy organization-defined frequency and following organization-defined events; and
Procedures organization-defined frequency and following organization-defined events.
Identify, report, and correct system flaws;
Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;
Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within organization-defined time period of the release of the updates; and
Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.
The need to remediate system flaws applies to all types of software and firmware. Organizations identify systems affected by software flaws, including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities. Security-relevant updates include patches, service packs, and malicious code signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. By incorporating flaw remediation into configuration management processes, required remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of risk factors, including the security category of the system, the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw), the organizational risk tolerance, the mission supported by the system, or the threat environment. Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, such as when implementing simple malicious code signature updates. In testing decisions, organizations consider whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures.
Implement one or more,signature based,non-signature based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code;
Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;
Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:
Perform periodic scans of the system organization-defined frequency and real-time scans of files from external sources at one or more,endpoint,network entry and exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and
one or more,block malicious code,quarantine malicious code,take organization-defined action ; and send alert to organization-defined personnel or roles in response to malicious code detection; and
Address the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system.
System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote access servers, workstations, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats contained within compressed or hidden files or hidden in files using techniques such as steganography. Malicious code can be inserted into systems in a variety of ways, including by electronic mail, the world-wide web, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Malicious code protection mechanisms include both signature- and nonsignature-based technologies. Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include artificial intelligence techniques that use heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide controls against such code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. Malicious code for which active signatures do not yet exist or may be ineffective includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). Nonsignature-based mechanisms also include reputation-based technologies. In addition to the above technologies, pervasive configuration management, comprehensive software integrity controls, and anti-exploitation software may be effective in preventing the execution of unauthorized code. Malicious code may be present in commercial off-the-shelf software as well as custom-built software and could include logic bombs, backdoors, and other types of attacks that could affect organizational mission and business functions. In situations where malicious code cannot be detected by detection methods or technologies, organizations rely on other types of controls, including secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that, in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, the detection of malicious downloads, or the detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.
Monitor the system to detect:
Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives: organization-defined monitoring objectives; and
Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;
Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: organization-defined techniques and methods;
Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:
Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential information; and
At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;
Analyze detected events and anomalies;
Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation;
Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and
Provide organization-defined system monitoring information to organization-defined personnel or roles one or more,as needed, organization-defined frequency .
System monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at external interfaces to the system. Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the system. Organizations monitor systems by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives guide and inform the determination of the events. System monitoring capabilities are achieved through a variety of tools and techniques, including intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, and network monitoring software. Depending on the security architecture, the distribution and configuration of monitoring devices may impact throughput at key internal and external boundaries as well as at other locations across a network due to the introduction of network throughput latency. If throughput management is needed, such devices are strategically located and deployed as part of an established organization-wide security architecture. Strategic locations for monitoring devices include selected perimeter locations and near key servers and server farms that support critical applications. Monitoring devices are typically employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls #sc-7(#sc-7) and #ac-17(#ac-17). The information collected is a function of the organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of systems to support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. System monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs, and output from system monitoring serves as input to those programs. System monitoring requirements, including the need for specific types of system monitoring, may be referenced in other controls (e.g., [AC-2g](#ac-2_smt.g), [AC-2(7)](#ac-2.7), [AC-2(12)(a)](#ac-2.12_smt.a), [AC-17(1)](#ac-17.1), #au-13(#au-13), [AU-13(1)](#au-13.1), [AU-13(2)](#au-13.2), [CM-3f](#cm-3_smt.f), [CM-6d](#cm-6_smt.d), [MA-3a](#ma-3_smt.a), [MA-4a](#ma-4_smt.a), [SC-5(3)(b)](#sc-5.3_smt.b), [SC-7a](#sc-7_smt.a), [SC-7(24)(b)](#sc-7.24_smt.b), [SC-18b](#sc-18_smt.b), [SC-43b](#sc-43_smt.b)). Adjustments to levels of system monitoring are based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other sources of information. The legality of system monitoring activities is based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from organization-defined external organizations on an ongoing basis;
Generate internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;
Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to: one or more, organization-defined personnel or roles , organization-defined elements within the organization , organization-defined external organizations ; and
Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness throughout the Federal Government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance with security directives is essential due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential (immediate) adverse effects on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include supply chain partners, external mission or business partners, external service providers, and other peer or supporting organizations.
Verify the correct operation of organization-defined security and privacy functions;
Perform the verification of the functions specified in SI-6a one or more, organization-defined system transitional states ,upon command by user with appropriate privilege, organization-defined frequency ;
Alert organization-defined personnel or roles to failed security and privacy verification tests; and
one or more,Shut the system down,Restart the system, organization-defined alternative action(s) when anomalies are discovered.
Transitional states for systems include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. System notifications include hardware indicator lights, electronic alerts to system administrators, and messages to local computer consoles. In contrast to security function verification, privacy function verification ensures that privacy functions operate as expected and are approved by the senior agency official for privacy or that privacy attributes are applied or used as expected.
Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to the following software, firmware, and information: organization-defined software, firmware, and information; and
Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: organization-defined actions.
Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity. Software includes operating systems (with key internal components, such as kernels or drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware interfaces include Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) and Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). Information includes personally identifiable information and metadata that contains security and privacy attributes associated with information. Integrity-checking mechanisms?including parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes, and associated tools?can automatically monitor the integrity of systems and hosted applications.
Employ spam protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and act on unsolicited messages; and
Update spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.
System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote-access servers, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Spam can be transported by different means, including email, email attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include signature definitions.
Check the validity of the following information inputs: organization-defined information inputs to the system.
Checking the valid syntax and semantics of system inputs?including character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values?verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. For example, if the organization specifies that numerical values between 1-100 are the only acceptable inputs for a field in a given application, inputs of "387," "abc," or "%K%" are invalid inputs and are not accepted as input to the system. Valid inputs are likely to vary from field to field within a software application. Applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the corrupted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing them to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation ensures accurate and correct inputs and prevents attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.
Generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited; and
Reveal error messages only to organization-defined personnel or roles.
Organizations consider the structure and content of error messages. The extent to which systems can handle error conditions is guided and informed by organizational policy and operational requirements. Exploitable information includes stack traces and implementation details; erroneous logon attempts with passwords mistakenly entered as the username; mission or business information that can be derived from, if not stated explicitly by, the information recorded; and personally identifiable information, such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. Error messages may also provide a covert channel for transmitting information.
Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.
Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel. Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management and retention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, [AC-6(9)](#ac-6.9), #at-4(#at-4), #au-12(#au-12), #ca-2(#ca-2), #ca-3(#ca-3), #ca-5(#ca-5), #ca-6(#ca-6), #ca-7(#ca-7), #ca-8(#ca-8), #ca-9(#ca-9), #cm-2(#cm-2), #cm-3(#cm-3), #cm-4(#cm-4), #cm-6(#cm-6), #cm-8(#cm-8), #cm-9(#cm-9), #cm-12(#cm-12), #cm-13(#cm-13), #cp-2(#cp-2), #ir-6(#ir-6), #ir-8(#ir-8), #ma-2(#ma-2), #ma-4(#ma-4), #pe-2(#pe-2), #pe-8(#pe-8), #pe-16(#pe-16), #pe-17(#pe-17), #pl-2(#pl-2), #pl-4(#pl-4), #pl-7(#pl-7), #pl-8(#pl-8), #pm-5(#pm-5), #pm-8(#pm-8), #pm-9(#pm-9), #pm-18(#pm-18), #pm-21(#pm-21), #pm-27(#pm-27), #pm-28(#pm-28), #pm-30(#pm-30), #pm-31(#pm-31), #ps-2(#ps-2), #ps-6(#ps-6), #ps-7(#ps-7), #pt-2(#pt-2), #pt-3(#pt-3), #pt-7(#pt-7), #ra-2(#ra-2), #ra-3(#ra-3), #ra-5(#ra-5), #ra-8(#ra-8), #sa-4(#sa-4), #sa-5(#sa-5), #sa-8(#sa-8), #sa-10(#sa-10), #si-4(#si-4), #sr-2(#sr-2), #sr-4(#sr-4), #sr-8(#sr-8).
Determine mean time to failure (MTTF) for the following system components in specific environments of operation: organization-defined system components; and
Provide substitute system components and a means to exchange active and standby components in accordance with the following criteria: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria.
While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF value with consideration for the potential harm from component failures. The transfer of responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capabilities. The preservation of system state variables is also critical to help ensure a successful transfer process. Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.
Implement non-persistent organization-defined system components and services that are initiated in a known state and terminated one or more,upon end of session of use,periodically at organization-defined frequency .
Implementation of non-persistent components and services mitigates risk from advanced persistent threats (APTs) by reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. By implementing the concept of non-persistence for selected system components, organizations can provide a trusted, known state computing resource for a specific time period that does not give adversaries sufficient time to exploit vulnerabilities in organizational systems or operating environments. Since the APT is a high-end, sophisticated threat with regard to capability, intent, and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period, a percentage of attacks will be successful. Non-persistent system components and services are activated as required using protected information and terminated periodically or at the end of sessions. Non-persistence increases the work factor of adversaries attempting to compromise or breach organizational systems. Non-persistence can be achieved by refreshing system components, periodically reimaging components, or using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent services can be implemented by using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or as new instances of processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent). The benefit of periodic refreshes of system components and services is that it does not require organizations to first determine whether compromises of components or services have occurred (something that may often be difficult to determine). The refresh of selected system components and services occurs with sufficient frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact of attacks, but not with such frequency that it makes the system unstable. Refreshes of critical components and services may be done periodically to hinder the ability of adversaries to exploit optimum windows of vulnerabilities.
Validate information output from the following software programs and/or applications to ensure that the information is consistent with the expected content: organization-defined software programs and/or applications.
Certain types of attacks, including SQL injections, produce output results that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would be expected from software programs or applications. Information output filtering focuses on detecting extraneous content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and then alerting monitoring tools that anomalous behavior has been discovered.
Implement the following controls to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution: organization-defined controls.
Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Controls employed to protect memory include data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention controls can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware enforcement providing the greater strength of mechanism.
Implement the indicated fail-safe procedures when the indicated failures occur: organization-defined list of failure conditions and associated fail-safe procedures.
Failure conditions include the loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take. Subsequent steps may include doing nothing, reestablishing system settings, shutting down processes, restarting the system, or contacting designated organizational personnel.
Check the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle organization-defined frequency; and
Correct or delete inaccurate or outdated personally identifiable information.
Personally identifiable information quality operations include the steps that organizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of personally identifiable information. Personally identifiable information quality operations include editing and validating addresses as they are collected or entered into systems using automated address verification look-up application programming interfaces. Checking personally identifiable information quality includes the tracking of updates or changes to data over time, which enables organizations to know how and what personally identifiable information was changed should erroneous information be identified. The measures taken to protect personally identifiable information quality are based on the nature and context of the personally identifiable information, how it is to be used, how it was obtained, and the potential de-identification methods employed. The measures taken to validate the accuracy of personally identifiable information used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals covered under federal programs may be more comprehensive than the measures used to validate personally identifiable information used for less sensitive purposes.
Remove the following elements of personally identifiable information from datasets: organization-defined elements of personally identifiable information; and
Evaluate organization-defined frequency for effectiveness of de-identification.
De-identification is the general term for the process of removing the association between a set of identifying data and the data subject. Many datasets contain information about individuals that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual?s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother?s maiden name, or biometric records. Datasets may also contain other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. Personally identifiable information is removed from datasets by trained individuals when such information is not (or no longer) necessary to satisfy the requirements envisioned for the data. For example, if the dataset is only used to produce aggregate statistics, the identifiers that are not needed for producing those statistics are removed. Removing identifiers improves privacy protection since information that is removed cannot be inadvertently disclosed or improperly used. Organizations may be subject to specific de-identification definitions or methods under applicable laws, regulations, or policies. Re-identification is a residual risk with de-identified data. Re-identification attacks can vary, including combining new datasets or other improvements in data analytics. Maintaining awareness of potential attacks and evaluating for the effectiveness of the de-identification over time support the management of this residual risk.
Embed data or capabilities in the following systems or system components to determine if organizational data has been exfiltrated or improperly removed from the organization: organization-defined systems or system components.
Many cyber-attacks target organizational information, or information that the organization holds on behalf of other entities (e.g., personally identifiable information), and exfiltrate that data. In addition, insider attacks and erroneous user procedures can remove information from the system that is in violation of the organizational policies. Tainting approaches can range from passive to active. A passive tainting approach can be as simple as adding false email names and addresses to an internal database. If the organization receives email at one of the false email addresses, it knows that the database has been compromised. Moreover, the organization knows that the email was sent by an unauthorized entity, so any packets it includes potentially contain malicious code, and that the unauthorized entity may have potentially obtained a copy of the database. Another tainting approach can include embedding false data or steganographic data in files to enable the data to be found via open-source analysis. Finally, an active tainting approach can include embedding software in the data that is able to "call home," thereby alerting the organization to its "capture," and possibly its location, and the path by which it was exfiltrated or removed.
Refresh organization-defined information at organization-defined frequencies or generate the information on demand and delete the information when no longer needed.
Retaining information for longer than it is needed makes it an increasingly valuable and enticing target for adversaries. Keeping information available for the minimum period of time needed to support organizational missions or business functions reduces the opportunity for adversaries to compromise, capture, and exfiltrate that information.
Identify the following alternative sources of information for organization-defined essential functions and services: organization-defined alternative information sources; and
Use an alternative information source for the execution of essential functions or services on organization-defined systems or system components when the primary source of information is corrupted or unavailable.
Actions taken by a system service or a function are often driven by the information it receives. Corruption, fabrication, modification, or deletion of that information could impact the ability of the service function to properly carry out its intended actions. By having multiple sources of input, the service or function can continue operation if one source is corrupted or no longer available. It is possible that the alternative sources of information may be less precise or less accurate than the primary source of information. But having such sub-optimal information sources may still provide a sufficient level of quality that the essential service or function can be carried out, even in a degraded or debilitated manner.
Based on organization-defined circumstances:
Fragment the following information: organization-defined information; and
Distribute the fragmented information across the following systems or system components: organization-defined systems or system components.
One objective of the advanced persistent threat is to exfiltrate valuable information. Once exfiltrated, there is generally no way for the organization to recover the lost information. Therefore, organizations may consider dividing the information into disparate elements and distributing those elements across multiple systems or system components and locations. Such actions will increase the adversary?s work factor to capture and exfiltrate the desired information and, in so doing, increase the probability of detection. The fragmentation of information impacts the organization?s ability to access the information in a timely manner. The extent of the fragmentation is dictated by the impact or classification level (and value) of the information, threat intelligence information received, and whether data tainting is used (i.e., data tainting-derived information about the exfiltration of some information could result in the fragmentation of the remaining information).